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God, the Best, and Evil, by Bruce Langtry. Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp.
ix + 237. $70 (cloth).
WILLIAM L. ROWE, Purdue University
Langtry’s book is a significant contribution to the seemingly eternal problem of trying to explain how there can be such a vast amount of evil and
horrific suffering in a world that God has chosen to create. I suspect that
some who read this book will believe that he makes his task considerably
less difficult by declining to accept the standard Anselmian conception
of God as “an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being” who necessarily exists; giving as his reason that to do so “would impede substantial
debates currently taking place amongst theists, on such topics as whether
God is omnipotent and omniscient, as distinct from supremely powerful
and knowledgeable” (p. 7). In place of the Anselmian conception of God,
Langtry proposes that we view God as a contingent being who is such
that if he exists he is “the rational agent who brought the universe into
existence and who is, either non-temporally or at all times, very powerful,
very knowledgeable, and very good” (p. 7). Recognizing, however, that
such a conception of God is considerably different from the idea of God
toward which, for example, the problem of evil has largely been directed,
Langtry states that, for purposes of this book, the claim ‘God exists’ “unless there is a local indication to the contrary” is to be understood as follows: “God is the rational agent who brought the universe into existence
and who is, either non-temporally or at all times, omnipotent, infallibly
omniscient, and perfectly good” (p. 9). He does not, however, go so far as
to suggest that God is a necessary being, rather than a contingent being.
Langtry begins by considering some of the apparent implications of
divine omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness for God’s providence with respect to the world he creates. In particular, he investigates
whether God is in some sense a maximizer. By ‘a maximizer’ I believe
Langtry means one who always seeks to do the best he can, provided there
is a best that can be done. Second, he critically examines objections to the
existence of God that are based on the apparent fact that God could have
created a better world than the one he has in fact created. And third, he
assesses the strength of objections to the existence of God that focus on the
problem of evil.
To create a (possible) world is to strongly or weakly actualize it. A world
is prime if God can create it, and he cannot create a world better than it.
Langtry’s conclusions include the following:
(1) If there is at least one prime world, then if God does create some world
he will create a prime world.
(2) If there are no prime worlds, then it does not follow that God does not exist.
Instead, what follows is that if God creates a world he will create one that is
good enough, despite the fact that he could create a world which is better.
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(3) This conclusion does not give rise to a good objection to theism, based
on the apparent fact that the actual world is improvable and yet it is not
good enough.
(4)	Even if there is a best world, or several equal-best worlds, God cannot
create any of them.
(5) A good partial theodicy for evil can be provided, appealing to goods
bound up with human free will, moral responsibility, and the roles of
individuals’ own personal traits in shaping their own and other people’s
lives. The partial theodicy is neutral between Theological compatibilism
and libertarianism.
(6) The problem of evil does not provide a very strong objection to the existence of God.

As noted above, Langtry sets forth the following conception of God: “(if
God exists) God is the rational agent who brought the universe into existence and who is, either non-temporally or at all times, very powerful, very
knowledgeable, and very good” (p. 7). From this and other remarks he
makes, it is reasonably clear that Langtry’s own view is that God is a contingent being—he exists in some possible worlds, but in other worlds he
does not exist. In my judgment this is a somewhat diminished view of God.
For it allows one to imagine God as bowing down and thanking his lucky
stars that the actual world just happens to be one of the worlds in which he
exists. In its place, I would suggest the following: God, an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being, is such that if he exists in any possible world
he exists in every possible world. On this conception, God is either a necessary being (exists in every possible world) or an impossible being (exists in
no possible world). Moreover, unless I am mistaken, it is a conception of
God that is acceptable to many theists, agnostics, and atheists.
Langtry carefully describes three distinct positions on divine providence: Theological Determinism, Molinism, and Open Theism, but focuses mainly on Molinism and Open Theism. Theological determinism is
the view that God directly brings about every contingent state of affairs,
a view that appears to preclude acts that are freely done by human beings. Molinism allows that God knows the “counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom” (what a person would freely choose to do should that person
happen to be in a certain situation), and therefore knows what a person
will freely choose to do in situation X, should that person be in situation X;
whereas Open Theism denies that God possesses such knowledge.
Putting aside Theological Determinism, a view which appears to preclude any significant degree of human freedom, so far as the debate between Molinism and Open Theism is concerned, my own view (for what
it is worth) is strongly on the side of Molinism. For Molinism, while allowing for libertarian free choices among human creatures, provides a way in
which God has some knowledge of what his human creatures will freely
choose to do in their future free actions. For, according to Molinism, God
knows the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom—and such knowledge
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provides God with the means of having some degree of influence over the
future of the world he has created. In Open Theism, God is understood to
be somewhat in the dark concerning what his human creatures will freely
choose to do in their future free actions.
It is reasonably clear, I believe, that Langtry’s own view is much closer
to Open Theism than it is to Molinism. His view appears to be this: if there
is a best world, God (a perfect being) will or must create it. If there is no
best world, i.e., if for every possible world there is a better possible world,
God will create a world that is “good enough”; never mind that he could
have created a much better world instead. Langtry doesn’t suggest what
conditions would render a world “good enough” should there be an unending series of increasingly better creatable worlds. Clearly, however, as
a theist he believes that a world containing the holocaust—the extermination of approximately six million European Jews as part of a program of
deliberate extermination planned and executed by the National Socialist
German Workers’ Party during Hitler’s regime—is a world that is good
enough for an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being to create,
even supposing such a being could have created a much better world instead. However, as a theist who appears to side with Open Theism, Langtry, I suspect, must allow the possibility that God, in looking back at the
holocaust, might say to himself: “if only I had known that this would happen, I would have endeavored to create a better world than this one.” Theists who hold to the Anselmian view of God (an omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly good being who necessarily exists) emphasize the importance
of human free will and introduce interesting theodicies in an effort to set
forth a plausible explanation of why an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly
good being would permit so much horrendous evil to occur in the world.
For on the Anselmian view, given that God knows the counterfactuals of
freedom, God does have knowledge of the future free acts of his human
creatures, and thus may know, for example, that apart from His intervention, the holocaust will occur.
As Langtry notes, in my book Can God Be Free? I advance the following
principle as a necessary truth.
B: If an omniscient being creates a world (a maximal state of affairs)
when it could have created a better world, then it is possible that there
be a being morally better than it.
If Principle B expresses a necessary truth and there exists an infinity of
increasingly better worlds, then no being who creates a world can be an
omniscient and morally perfect being. Langtry denies Principle B, agreeing that if there is a best world, God, a perfectly good being, must create
it; but allowing that should there be an unending series of increasingly
better creatable worlds God would be free to create a good world, even
though there is an infinity of increasing better creatable worlds. He calls
this satisficing: selecting a world that is good enough even though there
is an infinity of increasingly better worlds, any one of which is creatable
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by an omnipotent, omniscient being. Such a view was set forth in his paper ‘God and the Best’ (Faith and Philosophy, 13 [1996], pp. 311–328). Now
that I’ve read his recently published book, God the Best, and Evil, and understand more fully that he personally thinks of God not as a necessary
being but as a contingent being, a being who, instead of actually being
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good, is only “very powerful, very
knowledgeable, and very good,” I can understand more clearly why he
feels justified in rejecting the view that the vast amount of human and
animal suffering on our planet counts significantly against the existence
of God. For if God is merely a contingent being, a being who has considerable power and knowledge, but falls far short of being omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and eternal, it is to some extent understandable
why there might be such vast amounts of evil and suffering in our world.
For such a being as Langtry understands God to be may simply lack any
significant knowledge of what his creatures may choose to do in their
future free acts.
Moreover, if Langtry’s God doesn’t know what the future of our world
will be so far as the free actions of his human creatures are concerned, it
is understandable that although there may be other creatable worlds any
one of which he could have created instead—worlds in which his human
creatures freely choose to do much more good and much less evil—God,
as Langtry conceives of him, may not know this, and thus might be in
the dark as to whether his selection of a particular world to create would
result in a better or a worse world than some other world he could have
selected to create instead. So, given Langtry’s conception of God, he is correct to conclude that principle B is simply inapplicable to God. For God,
as Langtry conceives of him, fails to be omniscient in the sense of possessing knowledge of the future free acts of his human creatures. Therefore, although Langtry’s God may be the greatest of existing beings, he
falls far short of being “the greatest possible being.” In fact, Langtry views
God as displaying human emotions of anger, and perhaps despair. Thus,
he quotes approvingly William Hasker’s description of God as “taking
risks” and as experiencing “aversion, anger, or disappointment over the
actual course of events” (p. 28). Again, I believe, we are confronted with
a rather diminished view of God—a being who does not know what he
will confront in the future, who wonders what his free creatures will do
tomorrow, hopes for the best, but fears the worst, and becomes angry and
frustrated when things don’t go as well as he hoped they would. Perhaps
some, or even many human beings will find comfort and satisfaction in
such a conception of God, but others, I suspect, will see it as a significantly
diminished view of God in comparison with the Anselmian view in which
God is understood to be the greatest possible being: a necessarily existing
being who created the world and is essentially omnipotent, omniscient,
and perfectly good.
Nevertheless, I suspect that the horrific evils, both natural and moral,
that afflict human and animal life on our planet constitute somewhat less
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of a problem if one holds the view that God is a contingent being and,
although very good, powerful, and knowledgeable, falls short of being
omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. For if God has little, if any,
foreknowledge of what the future will bring he simply may be unable to
take the appropriate steps to prevent horrendous evils from occurring.
However, to avoid confusion, we must keep in mind Langtry’s initial commitment that “unless there is a local indication to the contrary” the conception of God under consideration is to be understood as follows: “God
is the rational agent who brought the universe into existence and who is,
either non-temporally or at all times, omnipotent, infallibly omniscient,
and perfectly good” (p. 9). So, it is only when Langtry is considering his
own preferred conception of God that we need refrain from viewing the
God under consideration as lacking omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness.
Although Langtry rejects my principle B, he does endorse a somewhat
weaker principle that approaches principle B: “Other things being equal,
in intentionally bringing about the better state of affairs one acts in the
morally better way” (p. 322). Moreover, at one point he explicitly states:
“A being who could have acted in a morally better way is not morally perfect” (p. 323). While this remark may appear to be quite close to principle
B, Langtry carefully adds the statement: “This principle can easily be misunderstood. It does not entail that if there are no prime worlds then God
is not perfectly good.” Even if we allow Langtry’s claim that God’s perfect
goodness is compatible with there being no prime worlds, this question
remains: does the statement: “A being created a world with free human
creatures, when he could have created a much better world with free human creatures” imply that the being in question could have acted “in a
morally better way”? If so, then I suspect that it remains reasonable to seriously question whether God, a perfectly good being, exists.

Religion in Public Life: Must Faith Be Privatized? by Roger Trigg. Oxford
University Press, 2007. Pp. 262. $65 (cloth)
NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF, Yale University and University of Virginia
Roger Trigg’s Religion in Public Life is a wide-ranging discussion of the
many problems posed by the presence of religious diversity within modern liberal democratic states. The basic thesis which shapes the discussion
is stated in brief summary form at the end of the book: “Public debate
about the proper basis for society is necessary, and religious voices should
be heard in that debate. Religion has not just been one of the most formative influences on human society; religions make claims, which, if true,
would be of universal importance. Religious voices must be heard in the
public life of every country” (p. 235).

